Any illusions scientists at Brookhaven National Laboratory had that they could continue their half-century of fundamental research in splendid isolation were shattered the night of 16 January 1996. More than 700 people-both lab employees and Long Island neighbors-crammed Brookhaven's Berkner auditorium that chilly winter night to hear about contaminated water found in some local drinking wells. Angry and worried residents wanted warm reassurances; instead, Brookhaven and Department of Energy (DOE) scientists spoke dispassionately about risk analysis, flow rates, and billions of parts per gallon and promised to hook neighbors up to public water.
Ironically, Brookhaven is itself a child of politics. As the United States moved from a hot to a cold war, physicists from a handful of prestigious northeastern universities yearned for a nuclear research facility nearby that would be a scientific equal to Los Alamos in New Mexico and Oak Ridge in Tennessee. In 1946 the government awarded a contract to a consortium called Associated Universities Inc. (AUI), which chose an old Army base at the eastern end of Long Island as the lab's site.
In the early days, neighborhood issues were virtually nonexistent: Set deep in the pine barrens and downwind from New York City, the 13,000-hectare lab had few neighbors. A few small communities of potato farmers and fishers dotted the eastern half of Long Island, while the occasional beach resort clung to the southern coast. The facility sat at the muddy headwaters of the Peconic River and on top of the freshwater aquifer that extends the length of the sandy island.
The lab kept a low profile even as it grew into a sprawling collection of accelerators, reactors, and other facilities with more than 3000 employees, a $400 million annual budget, and a stream of out-of-state visitors. It lacked the heroic legacy of Los Alamos and the economic clout of Oak Ridge. Instead, Brookhaven scientists went about their business largely invisible to the outside world. "We just faded into the background," recalls one researcher.
AUI preferred it that way. Unlike the large and powerful University of California, which runs Los Alamos, AUI was "12 men and a phone booth," jokes lab physicist Stephen Shapiro. AUI's board, made up of distinguished academics, focused on the lab's scientific direction and left the details of administration to onsite employees. Nor did the organization court politicians and bureaucrats. Brookhaven never had an influential patron, like Los Alamos has in Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), nor the staunch backing of an entire state political apparatus, as Oak Ridge does. "In Washington, a lot of people didn't know Brookhaven existed," says Peter Bond, a physicist who served as interim director in 1997-98.
For decades, the strategy succeeded brilliantly. Work at the Cosmotron accelerator generated a Nobel Prize in physics, and its successor, the Alternating Gradient Synchrotron, produced three more laureates. There were ominous stumbles, such as the cancellation in 1983 of a large accelerator called Isabelle, but by and large the lab established a reputation among researchers for serious science without the hype. " [Samios] told me to keep my head down, do my research, and leave the rest to him," recalls one scientist. Coming online in 1965 as the lab's third reactor, HFBR fit in well with the lab's low profile. It lacked the scientific sex appeal of the proton accelerator at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in Batavia, Illinois, with its expansive promise of exploring conditions during the first moments of creation. However, the reactor's intense beams of neutrons, which can penetrate deeply into materials, gave physicists, biologists, and chemists a tool to probe the hidden structure of everything from crystals to ceramics to polymers to blood plasma. The potential applications drew a steady stream of researchers from companies and universities around the world.
Revenge of the C students
As the reactor aged, however, problems began piling up alongside its impressive research results. Designed for a 25-year life at a maximum power level of 40 megawatts, the reactor was upgraded to 60 megawatts in 1982 before safety concerns forced operators to scale back power to 30 megawatts. In March 1994, a fire in the casing surrounding a target of uranium-235 used in an experiment raised questions about the lab's safety procedures. About the same time, officials also began to worry about wear and tear on the aluminum beam tubes exposed to the neutron streams, and reactor operators were eager to replace the cylindrical vessel holding the fuel elements-an upgrade that would cost as much as $200 million.
The lab also faced a growing list of environmental problems. It had inherited chemical dumps from the site's days as an Army base, adding piles of low-level radioactive glass and discharges of heavy metals and plutonium into the Peconic River. In 1985, the well of an elementary school just outside the gates showed evidence of increased levels of tritium, although its source was unclear, and a handful of home wells tested positive for various chemical compounds. In 1988, a team of DOE environmental and safety inspectors-who dubbed themselves "the revenge of the C students" because of their tough stance on waste generated by scientific research-visited DOE labs and pinpointed Brookhaven as one of the hot spots. The following year, it was designated a Superfund site, which mandates increased scrutiny and cleanup of a badly polluted area. By 1996, five of six underground plumes containing concentrations of wastes that exceeded drinking water standards had migrated beyond the lab's gates.
None of these setbacks was as damaging to the lab's image as the tritium leak, however. It was discovered in late 1996, when the reactor was closed for routine maintenance. To save money, designers had decided not to use a second liner in the storage pool underneath the reactor, a precaution taken at other DOE reactors built in that era. The result was a spreading plume of water, with tritium concentrations more than twice New York state's standards.
Both researchers and environmental activists agree that contamination at Brookhaven is far less severe than at weapons production areas such as South Carolina's Savannah River or Washington state's Hanford Reservation. But the environmental problems at Brookhaven are complicated by its location on the Peconic and above the aquifer in an area with a large and rapidly increasing population. It isn't the only source of pollution-industrial plants have sprung up in the area, and potato farmers are heavy users of powerful pesticides. But Brookhaven drew the wrath of neighbors who rely on well water. Part of their anger stemmed from fears that the lab was doing secret and potentially dangerous research, and part from the contractor's insistence until 1987 that it was legally exempt from Suffolk County water-purity regulations. "The perception was that Brookhaven thought itself above the law," says activist and social studies teacher Connie Kepert. "The lab operated like a foreign country," adds Adrienne Esposito, another community activist.
Samios and some other current and former Brookhaven officials reject the notion that Brookhaven was an irresponsible neighbor. And the DOE science office, which is ultimately responsible for the department's civilian labs, continued to give AUI high marks for its performance right up until the contractor was abruptly fired in 1997. But David Schweller, who headed the DOE office at the lab for most of the 1980s, says that lab managers were too focused on science at the expense of assuring safety and protecting the environment. His memos on the growing environmental troubles at the lab were ignored by both AUI and the DOE hierarchy. "I was told we're here to do science and to peddle my papers elsewhere," he says.
Contact sport
Brookhaven's neighbors were more than willing to take on the lab, however. "Activism is a contact sport here," says Mannhaupt, a community leader who focused attention on Brookhaven's problems (see facing page). In the 1980s, for example, a powerful coalition of antinuclear, environmental, and community groups successfully blocked the planned start-up of the Shoreham nuclear power plant, several kilometers from Brookhaven. "Long Island is a hotbed for all environmental, safety, and health issues," says Schweller. It is also a hotbed for rumors of government cover-ups, such as in the recent mysterious crash of a commercial jet offshore or wilder talk of dead aliens kept in Brookhaven tunnels.
The January 1997 announcement of the reactor leak only confirmed the suspicions of county officials, activists, and neighbors. After receiving complaints for many years, the lab promised in 1994 to dig test wells near the reactor. But DOE and the lab did not allocate money for them until 1996. In retrospect, that was a mistake, says Bill Gunther, the lab's senior environmental adviser. So when DOE and lab managers tried to explain that the plume was confined well within the lab grounds and posed no obvious threat to public health, their words were greeted with deep suspicion. "People felt like they had been lied to again," says Mannhaupt.
The lab's precious isolation, while helpful in conducting its research, now proved a tremendous handicap. There had been efforts to connect with the community through open houses and a speakers' bureau, but the outreach, according to lab biologist Dieter Schneider, "was geared to the high school level-a little on the trivial side." Samios says AUI lacked the expertise to carry out a strong public relations campaign before or during the HFBR crisis, and he doubts that such a campaign would have made a difference. "The public is only interested if someone says there's a big danger," he argues. But
Esposito, who lives in nearby Patchogue, says the problem was not PR, but scientific arrogance. "The attitude toward the public was that it was ignorant and stupid and could not understand," she says.
Cleaning house
News of the leak put Brookhaven in an unaccustomed spotlight. DOE's oversight office quickly launched an investigation and concluded that the lab "has not kept pace with contemporary expectations for protection of the public, the workers, and the environment." The report also strongly criticized DOE for its confusing hierarchy, ineffective oversight, and poor management of the lab.
Energy Secretary Federico Peña, fresh from Senate confirmation, flew to Brookhaven on 1 May and fired AUI-an unprecedented move in the department's history and one that rocked the DOE complex. Some lab officials say Peña's decision was a cynical attempt to assert his power. They see it as an effort to blame the lab for the troubles and shield DOE from criticism. But DOE managers maintain it was the only way to deal with a contractor that had been lax in dealing with both the environment and the public.
Paul Martin, the Harvard physicist who chairs the AUI board, declined to discuss the ouster. And AUI hasn't gone out of business-it still operates the National Radio Astronomy Observatory for the National Science Foundation. But Brookhaven's Shapiro says that the organization "failed on the operations end" of overseeing the lab. DOE's Schweller agrees. "Just because you're a great scientist doesn't mean you're a great administrator." Even Samios, who was appointed by AUI, says that the consortium had fossilized into "a self-perpetuating board" heading "a powerless organization."
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The removal of AUI stoked the controversy. The congressional General Accounting Office investigated, local media like Newsday kept up a drumbeat of coverage, and demonstrators outside the main gate soon were carrying skull-and-crossbones signs recalling Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. Protesters in white jumpsuits and surgical masks rallied against the HFBR, one man went on a hunger strike, and an auxiliary Catholic bishop from Detroit warned that the lab's polluting ways ran counter to God's wishes. "It became a circus," says Samios with undisguised disgust. Although DOE promised to appoint a new contractor, conduct a full study of the environmental impact of restarting the reactor, and maintain frequent contact with citizens' groups, it and the lab were losing ground. "Why on Earth would we trust that institution after Hanford and Rocky Flats?" says Alec Baldwin, who grew up on Long Island. "They've never been forthcoming. They lied and lied and lied and covered up for decades. The whole lab is corrupt."
In the summer of 1997, Baldwin and others formed Standing for Truth About Radiation (STAR), an organization based in fashionable East Hampton with an impressive board of wealthy New Yorkers and well-known activists (see story). Their goal was to prevent a restart of what they believed was a dangerous and dirty reactor. "You don't put a reactor in the middle of a crowded island with a sole-source aquifer," says Helen Caldicott, STAR's founding president. "And Brookhaven has made a terrible toxic cocktail." Brookhaven scientists were infuriated by what they felt was a gross exaggeration of the dangers. "The word 'nuclear' wiped out all sense of reason," says physicist Tranquada. "You don't yell radiation on a crowded island," says another researcher. Even local activists were offended by what they viewed as the arrival of Johnny-come-latelies more interested in combat than cooperation. "Environmental carpetbaggers," snorts Mannhaupt, who was open to the idea of restarting the reactor if it could be done safely. "We disagreed with the environmentalists, who said there is no solution," adds Kepert.
The increasingly cantankerous fight was a political powder keg for local Representative Michael Forbes, a rookie Republican in the midst of switching parties. After expressing concern about the reactor, Forbes apologized to lab employees in July 1997 for his earlier doubts and said "it is a safe reactor."
Then he flipped again. At a hastily scheduled press conference in September 1997 in nearby Mineola, Forbes and Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY) shocked and surprised lab managers by announcing that they opposed restarting the reactor. "That was the death knell of the HFBR," says one Brookhaven manager. Washington and Long Island sources cite Forbes's desire to attract contributions from wealthy Democrats on the island's east end by aligning himself with environmental causes.
Forbes, who declined repeated requests by Science to discuss the issue, also used Congress's power of the purse by inserting language into DOE spending bills forbidding the lab from spending money toward the reactor's restart. Some lawmakers such as Domenici disliked the language. But faced with the unusual circumstance of a lawmaker denying funds to his own district, they supported their colleague 3 years running. In the meantime, lab officials hoped that an environmental impact statement supporting restart would convince Forbes to lift the funding ban.
Celebrity politics
Feeling under the gun, Brookhaven scientists adopted some of the tactics of their opponents. They gathered more than 18,000 names on a petition urging the reactor's restart, held rallies, sent heaps of letters to Richardson, and spent innumerable hours at community meetings. But time was running out. The outside researchers that make up BESAC had supported restart of the reactor under three conditions-if it could be put online in a timely fashion, ultimately double its power, and not impose a budget strain-and it soon became clear that none of those conditions could be met.
"We were clearly getting out of range of a prompt restart," says Martha Krebs, who at the time was DOE science office chief. The proposal to double the power evoked fierce opposition from the community, the estimated costs of restarting HFBR began to climb, and the environmental impact statement was mired in DOE bureaucracy.
The controversy heated up further in January 1999, when Baldwin, Caldicott, and STAR counsel Scott Cullen met with new Energy Secretary Richardson. The STAR officials proposed an environmental assessment to be overseen by the community rather than DOE. "We didn't say shut down the HFBR," says Baldwin. Cullen believes Richardson was sympathetic to the idea of a separate study but unwilling to pay for it. Caldicott says that STAR officials reminded Richardson that "he has political aspirations with [Vice President Al] Gore, and if he didn't shut [the HFBR] down, there would be political ramifications."
In April, the scientists had their turn. Meeting in the secretary's office overlooking the Smithsonian castle, Robert Birgeneau, dean of science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Frank Bates, a chemical engineer at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, and head of the Neutron Scattering Society, argued vehemently for a $200 million upgrade as well as a restart, according to sources familiar with the meeting. They said other facilities could not match the HFBR's capabilities.
But managers of the department's science programs sang a different tune at the 45-minute meeting, the sources add. Krebs and DOE basic energy sciences chief Pat Dehmer told Richardson that BESAC's conditions would be hard to meet. A restart likely could not happen before 2002, they said, and would add $10 million to the annual outlay of more than $20 million that DOE already was spending on the downed reactor. The extra cost, worried BESAC chair Richmond, could wipe out funds set aside for hundreds of graduate student stipends. And then there was the threat of lawsuits from antinuclear and environmental groups, which could lead to further delays and political headaches.
Richardson held a third meeting in October, with model Christie Brinkley, a newly named STAR board member, and her husband, architect Peter Cook, shortly after the couple met with President Bill Clinton during a visit to Washington. Cullen, who also attended, said Brinkley expressed her concerns about the HFBR, including the potential exposure by workers to cancer-causing substances and local groundwater contamination. Although Mannhaupt complains about the Administration's willingness to meet with celebrities but not local activists, DOE officials insist that the meetings were not pivotal moments in the fight over the reactor. "I see no evidence STAR had an impact on the decision or the process," says Krebs, who did not attend either meeting.
Krebs had her own worries, which included costly upgrades under way or planned for two other DOE neutron sources and an increasingly difficult struggle to fund a $1.3 billion Spallation Neutron Source at Oak Ridge. She and BESAC members say they grew convinced that closing the HFBR, although it would pose short-term problems for the neutron-scattering community, was for the long-term benefit of researchers given the pressing need for the Oak Ridge facility.
On 16 November, Richardson announced that the reactor would be shut down. Emphasizing that the HFBR posed no health threat, he declared that "we need to focus our limited resources on productive research."
Blame game
The decision-and its timing-infuriated lab officials as well as many activists. Both sides were gearing up for a public debate over the environmental impact statement, the draft version of which stated that there was no pressing reason to keep the reactor closed. "Washington took public participation out of our hands," says Mannhaupt angrily. "It's a hell of a way to run science policy, and a hell of a way to work with a community," adds local civic activist and former Brookhaven employee Don Garber.
Even STAR officials complained. Baldwin and Cullen say that Richardson deliberately defused public outrage over the leaks and waste dumps at the lab by abruptly ending the debate. In a meeting with reporters, Richardson insisted that budgetary reasons, not politics, were behind his decision: "I don't like to close scientific facilities, but it made no sense to restart it." He added that "my scientists unanimously said 6 months ago that we should shut it down." Both Dehmer and Krebs confirm that they recommended closing the facility prior to Richardson's decision. "It's never easy to make a decision like this, but sometimes you have to," says Dehmer. Now DOE and Brookhaven must decide whether to mothball or decommission the reactor-the latter would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Meanwhile, the lab's new contractor, Brookhaven Science Associates, gets good marks from all sides, and director John Marburger has been successful in establishing a basic level of trust between activists and the lab. Even Caldicott gives him grudging praise. "I respect him," she says, while insisting that all radiation-related activities at the lab should cease.
The emotional aftermath is harder to calculate. Lab scientist Tranquada remains deeply upset about the decision. "I'm still overcoming the loss," he says, his voice breaking in frustration. "There's a facility with 15 instruments and no place to put them." Longtime Brookhaven materials scientist James Hurst retired in December, complaining that DOE "should have drawn the line in the sand" to prevent antinuclear groups from thinking they could shut down other facilities as well. "Maybe I'm naïve, but I think this should have been about science," he says.
Beyond the blame game, however, some researchers and managers say they've learned a hard lesson about an axiom-perception is reality-that is taken for granted by politicians. "As a scientist, you believe in marshaling the facts and proceeding in a logical fashion," says Shapiro, "but politics adds so many variables." Adds SUNY's Crease, "People don't take in facts nakedly, and it is naïve to say that facts speak for themselves."
What happened at Brookhaven, say Crease and others, should be a stark warning to scientists about the growing public fears over everything from research involving fetal tissue to genetically modified crops. "It's very sobering," says Bates. "There are thousands of labs around the country doing work that may not be in vogue, and I hate to think they will become cannon fodder for local politicians." To win over such critics, says Mannhaupt, scientists need to fight fire with fire. "They need a kick-ass logo, they need a hip-hop song," she says.
But the battle over HFBR also demonstrates that researchers who ignore those who fund and regulate them can't expect help when the going gets tough. "Scientists have to look beyond their own self-interest to the neighborhood in which they work," says Richmond. "If we want to be part of a community," she warns, "we can't act like prima donnas."
